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Abstract 
This paper aims at demystifying the international actorness of the European Union (EU) 
in cyberspace by assessing the extent to which the EU possesses sufficient capabilities 
to become a global cyber-power. For this purpose, the analysis relies on a kinetic 
approach based on the evaluation of four intertwined criteria: it first assesses the 
domestic features of the EU’s cyber-actorness (resilience and coherence) to be able 
to further determine the characteristics of the EU’s international cyber-actorness 
(attractiveness and responsiveness). The presence of both domestic criteria 
constitutes a fertile ground to assess the EU’s actorness externally. 
The paper argues that the EU has evolved from an inward-looking cyber-actor to a 
globally-oriented one. Internally, the EU has proved to be resilient, leading to the 
emergence of a ‘collective cyber-securitisation’ at the pace of cyber-attacks. 
Moreover, the EU has spontaneously leant towards a decentralised ‘asymmetric 
governance’ to overcome internal pitfalls such as national resistance linked to 
sovereignty issues. On the international stage, torn between a proactive and a 
reactive approach, the role of the EU as a cyber-actor is still blurred. Through a dense 
network of partnerships and international ‘magnetism’, the EU is shaping a ‘collective 
immunity’ in cyberspace by projecting its vision, norms, and values abroad. However, 
the EU’s international actorness remains imbued with a ‘paradoxical sleep’: the brain 
acts, but the body is asleep. 
The main conclusion is that the EU has become a budding global cyber-player that 
remains paralysed by its own inherent paradoxes and internal stalemates. Devoid of 
means to fulfil its global ambitions, the EU’s ‘cyber-power’ remains limited to the 
regional scope. The EU is not yet a ‘Guardian of the Galaxy’ in cyberspace, but it does 
have the potential to become a globally influential and effective cyber-power if it 
manages to overcome its sui generis schizophrenic nature provoked by the tensions 




Introduction: cyberspace, a known unknown world to rule for the EU 
 
In an increasingly interconnected world, cyberspace has emerged as a complex and 
multidimensional arena. Rooted in the rapid pace of technological developments, 
new borderless security challenges have emanated from this recent phenomenon 
and they have been escorted by a constellation of fast-evolving threats. The digital 
era is paradoxical: the more advanced and digitalised states become, the more 
exposed and vulnerable they are to a growing number of malicious state and non-
state cyber-actors.1 
In recent years, ‘cyber-hysteria’ has spread to inter-state competition and 
geopolitics.2 Cyberspace has become a contested area where stakeholders with 
divergent visions fight to rule it, and it is now “used by states as an equaliser for levelling 
the geopolitical playing field”. 3  Given the fast proliferation of transnational and 
innovative threats, cyber-concerns became a strategic security priority for the 
European Union (EU). In 2016, the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) proclaimed: “The EU will 
be a forward-looking cyber-player”.4 Four years later, where does the EU stand? 
This paper aims at demystifying the international actorness of the EU in cyberspace in 
order to ascertain how ‘cyber-capable’ the EU is and to highlight the particular 
hindrances faced by the EU in its quest for ‘global power’.5 The analysis assesses the 
EU’s capabilities, credibility and legitimacy in cyberspace. However, the paper does 
not aim to assess the effectiveness: the EU could be a ‘Guardian of the Galaxy’, that 
is a capable global cyber-power, but this does not automatically mean that the EU is 
an effective actor. By examining the EU’s ‘cyber-actorness’, the paper aims to 
understand what type of cyber-capabilities an international actor would need in this 
era of hybrid threats. The research question underpinning this paper is thus the 
                                                 
1 J. Limnell, “Russian cyber activities in the EU”, in N. Popescu & S. Secrieru (eds.), Hacks, leaks 
and disruptions. Russian cyber strategies, Chaillot Paper, no. 148, European Union Institute for 
Security Studies, Paris, October 2018, p. 72. 
2 N. Pospecu & S. Secrieru, “Conclusions”, in N. Popescu & S. Secrieru (eds.), Hacks, leaks and 
disruptions. Russian cyber strategies, Chaillot Paper, no. 148, European Union Institute for 
Security Studies, Paris, October 2018, p. 115. 
3  P. Pawlak & T. Biersteker, Guardian of the Galaxy. EU cyber sanctions and norms in 
cyberspace, Chaillot Paper, no. 155, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 
October 2019, p. 4. 
4 European External Action Service, Shared Vision, Common Action: a Stronger Europe – A 
Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, p. 42. 
5 In this study, ‘actor’ and ‘power’ are not used interchangeably. The paper assumes that the 
EU is a cyber-actor and could be called a cyber-power if it becomes a very capable actor in 
cyberspace. 
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following: to what extent does the EU possess sufficient capabilities to become a 
global cyber-power?  
The main argument is that the EU is a budding global cyber-power because it has the 
capabilities and the potential to become global cyber-power but remains hampered 
by its own inherent paradoxes and constraints that impede it from achieving all of its 
ambitious goals. For instance, the EU is torn by tenacious divergences among its 
member states that are not disposed to give too much power to Brussels. It is also 
constrained to adopt asymmetrical approaches or limited to the function of a mere 
mediator in cyberspace. 
The next section sets out the framework of analysis, followed by an overview of the 
evolving security environment and the cyber-threats this involves. The subsequent part, 
covering the EU’s ‘resilience’ and ‘coherence’, explores the EU’s domestic ‘collective 
cyber-securitisation’ and ‘asymmetric governance’ in cyberspace. This is then 
followed by an ’investigation of the EU’s ‘attractiveness’ and ‘responsiveness’ to assess 
the international projection of the EU in cyberspace. The conclusion summarises the 
findings and offers potential avenues for further research. 
 
Framework of analysis 
 
The EU’s cyber-policy can be differentiated across three areas: networks and 
information systems (NIS), cybercrime and cyber-defence. 6  According to the EU 
Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), cybersecurity can be defined as “compris[ing] all 
activities necessary to protect cyberspace, its users, and impacted persons from 
cyber-threats”.7 
This paper adapts the concept of ‘actorness’ from Bretherton and Vogler’s definition 
to fit with the cyber-domain. ‘Cyber-actorness’ stems from the combination of three 
interrelated components: the external cybersecurity environment connotes the 
existence of an opportunity; cyber-actorness is further determined by the capabilities 
of the EU (internal abilities to exploit); and by the EU’s presence (potential to project 
influence abroad).8 
                                                 
6  G. Christou, “The collective securitisation of cyberspace in the European Union”, West 
European Politics, vol. 42, no. 2, 2018, p. 281. 
7 ENISA, Overview of cybersecurity and related terminology, September 2017, p. 6. 
8 C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, London, Routledge, 2nd edn., 
2006, pp. 12-61. 
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More specifically, the analysis draws together existing insights on cyber-actorness into 
a framework of analysis constituted of four criteria which help to determine the 
capabilities of the EU as an international cyber-actor. Settled into a two-level kinetic 
process, these variables are interdependent: domestic capabilities (resilience and 
coherence) are considered as a pre-requirement to ensure the possibility to exert 
external capabilities (attractiveness and responsiveness). 
Resilience reflects the capability to “withstand, adapt and quickly recover from […] 
shocks”.9 It will be assessed through the scouring of EU legal documents and strategies. 
The main argument is that cyber-crises have been a major driver for positive changes 
in EU narratives, EU policy-making, EU architecture, and EU norms. 
Coherence, in terms of vertical coherence, connotes the capability to demonstrate 
cohesion and coordination between the European and national levels. The main 
argument is that whereas the primary responsibility for cybersecurity lies with the 
national governments, which may result in fragmentation, the EU remains the most 
efficient framework for addressing cyber-threats. 
Attractiveness is the capability to arouse interest in building international cooperation, 
to spread norms and values, and in fine to gain consideration. The main argument is 
that the EU is ‘immunising’ cyberspace through a dense network of partnerships and 
by building resilience in third countries.  
Responsiveness is defined as the capability to counter, deter and respond to cyber-
attacks. The main argument is that in spite of having an ambitious sanctions regime, 
the EU is still hindered by serious constraints such as the challenge of attribution or 
divergences among its members, and is limited to act only as an international 
mediator. Consequently, the lack of responsiveness overburdens the EU’s overall 
cyber-actorness on the international stage. 
Deeply intertwined, these criteria form the basis of a step-by-step approach. Each 
criterion encompasses one argumentative assessment and carries the same relative 
weight. The analysis relies on one major assumption: the stronger each criterion, the 
more likely the EU may become a powerful global cyber-player. Consequently, the 
final assessment relies on how each criterion does impact the EU’s global power in 
cyberspace. 
                                                 
9 European Commission & High Representative, A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s 
External Action, JOIN(2017) 21 final, Brussels, 7 June 2017, p. 3. 
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The evolving global security environment – e-trends: cyber is the new black 
The dark side of the web: the cyber-threat landscape in Europe and beyond 
Over a span of years, the global security environment has been deeply disturbed by 
a raise in transnational hybrid threats using cyber-means in a conventional conflict. 
The combination of domestic vulnerabilities and external pressures has pointed out the 
extent to which cyber-attacks can dramatically impact the proper functioning of 
states.10 This new configuration has fashioned cyberspace as an international theatre 
of tensions. In 2019, the world has known an “unprecedented level of state-run 
operations in cyberspace, driven by broader geopolitical considerations”.11 Recent 
reports have estimated that by 2027 “the global demand for offensive cyber-systems 
is expected to rise by 39%”.12 At home and abroad, the EU’s interests have been 
challenged by a series of cyber-operations led by state and non-state actors. These 
multifaceted threats have provoked a profound shift in how cyberspace is 
approached by the EU, conscious that its ‘good governance’ appears vital to ensure 
national, regional, and international security.  
The cyber-attack against Estonia in 2007 is known as the world’s first cyber-offensive 
targeting the entire digital infrastructure of an EU member state.13 More recently, 
criminals targeted the information systems of European structures dealing with 
defence or foreign affairs.14 Cyber-tools were also used to disrupt national elections 
making the risk of cyber-enabled meddling in internal political processes real.15 In 2017, 
two worldwide state-sponsored cyber-attacks (‘WannaCry’ and ‘NotPetya’) deeply 
affected the very heart of numerous European national entities. They showed that 
governmental actors are “both able and willing to undertake malicious cyber-
activities for political, economic or security gains”.16 Cybersecurity breaches have also 
                                                 
10 P. Pawlak, “Protecting and defending Europe’s cyberspace”, in N. Popescu & S. Secrieru 
(eds.), Hacks, leaks and disruptions. Russian cyber strategies, Chaillot Paper, no. 148, European 
Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, October 2018, p. 105. 
11 Pawlak & Biersteker, op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
12 P. Pawlak, E. Tikk & M. Kerttunen, “Cyber Conflict Uncoded – The EU and conflict prevention 
in cyberspace”, Conflict Series Brief, no. 7, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 
April 2020, p. 6. 
13 K. Ruus, “Cyber War I: Estonia Attacked from Russia”, European Affairs, vol. 9, issue 1-2, 2008. 
14 Pawlak, “Protecting and defending Europe’s cyberspace”, op. cit., p. 105. 
15 Limnell, op. cit., p. 71. 
16 E. Moret & P. Pawlak, The EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox: towards a cyber-sanctions regime?, 
Brief, no. 24, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, July 2017, p. 1. 
Constant Pâris 
8 
occurred against EU bodies, demonstrating that, far from being sheltered, the EU might 
be a privileged target. This evidenced the backwardness in the EU’s cybersecurity.17 
Cyber-attacks targeting Georgia, Ukraine or countries in the Western Balkans aspiring 
to join the EU or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) also alerted the EU of 
the potential risks of destabilising its neighbourhood. These attacks have “undermined 
democratic institutions, caused great economic loss and damaged critical 
infrastructures”.18 
Assessment: the Phantom menace of cyberspace 
The first decade of the 21st century illustrated that “cyber-conflicts were becoming 
commonplace around […] Europe”.19 Highlighting the EU’s deep vulnerabilities, cyber-
threats and their potential wide-ranging consequences have led to urgency in 
political debates. Rather than a mere technological challenge, building cyber-
resilience became a political task.20 It forced European leaders to actively develop 
adequate responses while minimising the negative impact of cyber-attacks. 
The following section focuses on how the EU adapted its behaviour and laid the 
foundations for shaping governance in this realm to best address them (resilience 
criterion). Then, the analysis zooms in on one level lower to assess whether member 
states are in line with the EU’s approach, both in terms of rationale and practices 
(coherence criterion). 
 
Resilience as the backbone of the EU’s collective securitisation in cyberspace 
 
The EU’s policy on cybersecurity has been triggered by both cyber-trends and 
imminent crises. Threat perceptions have shaped Brussels’ discourses and the 
challenge of securing cyberspace has risen up on the political agenda. 21 
Consequently, a large range of legal instruments and tools snowballed into the EU 
while new structures were either set-up or fortified. 
                                                 
17 H. Krause, “How to advance European cybersecurity?”, International Centre for Defence 
and Security, Estonia, 8 June 2018. 
18 P. Pernik, “The early days of cyberattacks: the cases of Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine”, in N. 
Popescu & S. Secrieru (eds.), Hacks, leaks and disruptions. Russian cyber strategies, Chaillot 
Paper, no. 148, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, October 2018,p. 63. 
19  D. Giantas & A. Liaropoulos, Cybersecurity in the EU. Threats, frameworks and future 
perspectives, Working Paper, no. 1, Piraeus, Laboratory of Intelligence & Cyber-Security, 
September 2019, p. 11. 
20 Pawlak, “Protecting and defending Europe’s cyberspace”, op. cit., p. 103. 
21 Christou, op. cit., p. 279. 
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The salience of cyber-threats in the EU’s narratives 
In the early 2000s, the EU’s narratives were silent on the conceptualisation of 
cyberspace as a security space. In 2004, the EU for the first time used the term as a 
‘threat’, when it realised that European critical infrastructures including Information 
and Communications Technology became vulnerable to cyber-terrorism.22 The 2005 
Council Framework Decision on Attacks Against Information Systems (AAIS) confirmed 
those concerns and stipulated that “attacks against information systems [… require] a 
response at the level of the EU”.23 
The 2007 Estonian shock gave governments a wake-up call about the potential 
impact of cyber-attacks on their national sovereignty. This watershed led to “a 
paradigm shift denoting the expansion of national security and defence into 
cyberspace”.24 Actors became focused on “how such attacks and threats might be 
addressed at EU level”.25 Cyber-issues were mentioned for the first time as strategic 
cross-sectorial challenges with an external dimension: “attacks against private or 
government IT systems in EU Member States have given [cybersecurity] a new 
dimension, as a potential new […] weapon”.26 The EU rapidly became aware of the 
‘cyber-paradox’: “not only have […] digital technologies become even more central 
to our economies and societies, but their vulnerability has increased and the number 
and seriousness of attacks has magnified”.27  
The EU identified cybersecurity as a strategic objective in its 2010 Internal Security 
Strategy. 28  However, Brussels became conscious that tackling cyber-challenges 
required tailor-made strategies. Thus, the 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy (2013 EUCSS) 
identified five strategic priorities aimed at achieving effective policies that address 
cyber-threats.29 The external dimension of cybersecurity flourished in unison with this 
internal strategy: tied to the promotion of European values, it called for a more active 
                                                 
22  European Commission, Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Fight Against Terrorism, 
COM(2004) 702 final, Brussels, 20 October 2004, pp. 3-4. 
23 Council of the EU, “Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks 
against information systems, Official Journal of the EU (OJ), L69, 16 March 2005, p. 67. 
24 Pernik, op. cit., pp. 58, 60. 
25 European Parliament, Resolution of 24 May 2007 on Estonia, 2007/2567 (RSP), 27 May 2007. 
26  European Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – 
Providing Security in a Changing World, S407/08, 11 December 2008, p. 5. 
27 Christou, 2018, op. cit., p. 290. 
28 Council of the EU, Internal Security Strategy for the EU: Towards a European Security Model, 
March 2010. 
29 European Commission & High Representative, Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: 
An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, JOIN(2013) 1 final, Brussels, 7 February 2013, pp. 4-5. 
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EU international engagement. In the following years, official documents clearly 
highlighted the centrality of cybersecurity for the shaping of future EU action and 
insisted on its international dimension.30 The 2016 EUGS framed cybersecurity as a key 
security component and reaffirmed the EU’s intention to be a “forward-looking cyber-
player”.31 After the 2017 ‘WannaCry’ and ‘NotPetya’ crises, EU narratives focused on 
the destructive magnitude of cyber-attacks and on the need to build resilience. 
Hence, a new Cybersecurity Strategy updated the 2013 EUCSS in 2017 (2017 EUCSS). 
It embraces three objectives: achieving EU cyber-resilience, creating effective cyber-
deterrence to reduce cybercrime, and strengthening international cooperation to 
promote cyber-stability.32 
The EU became conscious that cyberspace is a multidimensional world whose features 
need to be adequately addressed. Cybercrime and cyber-defence were rapidly 
incorporated into the EU agenda. The EU recognised cybercrime as an “integral part 
of efforts to develop an overarching EU strategy to strengthen cybersecurity”.33 It also 
categorised it as one of its main priorities on its Political Agenda on Security 2015-
2020.34 However, the EU’s reaction was not provoked by the precipitating events, but 
it was rather a response to an accumulation of crises forging an international trend, 
and overall prompted by the European Convention on Cybercrime adopted in 2001 
(Budapest Convention). The first incursion of the concept of ‘cyber-defence’ in the 
EU’s agenda and operations dates back to 2012. The 2017 EUCSS also called for the 
development of cyber-defence capabilities within the Common Security and 
Defence Policy framework.35 
The growing proliferation of malicious cyber-players has deepened the EU’s 
concerns.36 Russia represents the main challenge within the EU, and a complex issue, 
given the ties of some member states with the country. The ‘NotPetya’ malware 
attacks and cyber-coercion against Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine demonstrated the 
Russian ability to manipulate the cyberspace to undermine states’ power structures. 
                                                 
30 A. Barrinha & H. Carrapico, “How coherent if EU cybersecurity policy?”, EUROPP Blog, London 
School of Economics and Political Science, 2018. 
31 EEAS, EUGS 2016, op. cit., p. 42. 
32 European Commission & High Representative, Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building 
Strong Cybersecurity for the EU, JOIN(2017) 450 final, Brussels, 13 September 2017, p. 
33 European Commission, Tackling Crime in our Digital Age: Establishing a European Cybercrime 
Centre, COM(2012) 140 final, Brussels, 28 March 2012, p. 3. 
34 European Commission, The European Agenda on Security, COM(2015) 185 final, Strasbourg, 
28 April 2015. 
35 European Commission & High Representative, JOIN(2017) 450 final, op. cit., p. 2. 
36 Pawlak & Biersteker, op. cit., p. 76. 
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These cyber-offensives have spread amongst Europe a widely shared view that Russia 
poses the risk of cyber-warfare.37 It led to a profound atmosphere of mistrust within the 
EU where Russia is intuitively considered as the ‘usual suspect’ at the origin of every 
cyber-attack conducted in Europe. EU policymakers commonly admit and the 
extensive scope and hazardousness of Russia’s cyber-activities and condemn its 
behaviour.38 
The proliferation and legalisation of cyber-related norms and structures 
This section, combining a policy approach with legal analysis, scrutinises whether the 
transformation of narratives has been followed at the EU level by an alignment of 
policymakers and normative adjustments. Assessing the impact of crises on the 
development of EU cyber-related norms, it pictures cyber-attacks as a factor opening 
‘windows of opportunity’ used by policy entrepreneurs to trigger a legalisation 
process, that is the transformation of soft law (SL) into hard law (HL), whose distinction 
“is determined by […] the binding nature of the norm and the enforcement 
mechanism that ensures compliance with [it]”.39  
Throughout the 2000s, the EU relied on a soft law approach to regulate cyber-risks, 
symbolised by the emergence of non-legally binding EU documents and initiatives.40. 
Progressively, the body of EU norms relating to cybersecurity has grown.41 Figure 1 
traces the evolution of EU cyber-related norms over the last twenty years. 
 
                                                 
37 Pernik, op. cit., p. 57. 
38 Limnell, op. cit., p. 68. 
39 S. Saurugger & F. Terpan, “Explaining the transformation of law. The cases of economic 
governance, migration and cybersecurity”, Paper presented at the EUSA Conference, Denver, 
May 2019, pp. 2-3, 6. 
40 E. Fahey, “The EU’s Cybercrime and Cyber-Security Rulemaking: Mapping the Internal and 
External Dimensions of EU Security”, European Journal of Risk Regulation, vol. 5, no.1, 2014, p. 
49. 
41 R. A. Wessel, “Towards EU Cybersecurity law: regulating a new policy field”, in N. Tsagourias 
& R. Buchan (eds.), Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, pp. 403-425. 
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Source: Saurugger & Terpan, op. cit., p. 15. 
 
The 2007 cyber-attack against Estonia triggered an EU legalisation process and the 
adoption of preparatory acts in the following years.42 The subsequent series of cyber-
offensives throughout Europe and the related threat perceptions resulted in a parallel 
surge of soft norms. But it took time for the EU to adopt ‘harder’ legal instruments. 
Before 2013, the only case of hard law was the 2004 Council regulation creating ENISA 
and its revisions in 2008 and 2011. Since the 2013 EUCSS’s objective of “achieving 
cyber-resilience” the EU is going through a period of greater legalisation.43 Two main 
directives were adopted: the 2013 AAIS Directive, and the 2016 Networks and 
Information Systems Directive (the NIS Directive) which is “at the heart of the EU cyber-
resilience and a cornerstone of the EU’s effort to enhance its cybersecurity”. 44 
However, the influence of crises on the legalisation process seems less obvious. The 
2007-08 cyber-attacks have triggered reactions followed by an affluence of EU 
initiatives, but time was required for these proposals to be converted into enforceable 
norms. The legalisation phase, symbolised by the adoption of the AAIS and NIS 
Directives, may be a result of the 2007-08 cyber-attacks, but if so, it is an indirect 
outcome. 45  Nevertheless, crises in third countries, especially in Ukraine since the 
annexation of Crimea’ by the Russian Federation in 2014, might have led to the EU 
hardening its legal posture. 
It seems that the stronger the crisis, the higher the probability of legalisation.46 For 
instance, the 2017 peak of law creation might be explained as a reaction to the 
                                                 
42 Saurugger & Terpan, op. cit., pp. 27-28. 
43 Fahey, op. cit., p. 49. 
44 Giantas & Liaropoulos, op. cit., p. 18. 
45 Saurugger & Terpan, op. cit., p. 32. 
46 Ibid., p. 3. 
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gravity of the ‘Wannacry’ and ‘NotPetya’ attacks. The Cybersecurity Act, a regulation 
that entered into force in June 2019, reinforced ENISA’s mandate and established an 
EU-wide cybersecurity certification scheme.47 Later on, the Cyber Diplomatic Toolbox 
(Cyber-DT) set up the EU’s cyber-sanctions regime. 
The EU has over several years carefully drafted a ‘cyber-acquis’ in response to crises.48 
Driven by the need to support this new legal framework and in its pursuit of resilience-
building, the EU crafted appropriate structures for addressing cyber-issues. The 
creation, revamping or enhancement of cyber-specialised agencies – ENISA, the EU 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU), Europol’s European Cybercrime 
Centre (EC3) or the cyber branch of the European Defence Agency (EDA) – reflects 
the continuing EU adjustment to the insecure cyber-environment. 
Assessment: the EU is an internal securitising actor in cyberspace 
Cumulative cyber-threats have exposed member states’ vulnerabilities and raised 
awareness amongst European leaders. Symbolised by the EUCSSs, the perception of 
growing risks induced “a securitisation move by authoritative EU institutional actors”.49 
Consequently, the cyberspace has evolved into a mainstream security preoccupation 
while cyber-attacks have etched cyber-issues firmly onto the EU agenda. They acted 
as a catalyst for policy initiation, forcing the EU to make its approach to cybersecurity 
a more proactive. External pressures embodied an “impetus for the introduction of 
new security measures, the establishment of agencies and the formulation of a 
coordinated crisis response at the EU level”. 50  This change coincided with the 
development of a legal framework with common guidance for member states to 
ensure that cyber-issues, framed as a collective threat, are tackled through norms.51 
In the case of cybersecurity, the EU internal modus operandi was steadily adjusted at 
different points in time, both due to specific ad hoc emergencies and longer-term 
global trends. The incremental translation of EU narratives into concrete policies and 
legal initiatives shows a high degree of resilience. The EU has handled the challenges 
by sculpting a ‘collective cyber-securitisation’ within the European cyber-policy 
                                                 
47 Council of the EU & European Parliament, “Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of 17 April 2019 on ENISA 
and on ICT cybersecurity certification”, OJ, L151, 7 June 2019. 
48 Pawlak & Biersteker, op. cit., p. 28. 
49 Christou, 2018, op. cit., p. 286. 
50 Giantas & Liaropoulos, op. cit., p. 30. 
51 Christou, 2018, op. cit., p. 280. 
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space, as it has “justifie[d] its actions […] by reference to an identified threat”. 52 
However, this capability to build resilience can only be effective if the EU is able to 
achieve success in internal cybersecurity governance.53 To become an international 
cyber-power, the EU not only needs to show aptitudes in building cyber-resilience, but 
it must also be able to ensure coherence amongst its members. Admittedly, 
information exchange, cooperation and coordination are at the heart of resilience-
building. 
The following section assesses the ‘coherence’ criterion because “by acting in a co-
ordinated fashion, the EU will be a stronger actor”.54 
 
The coherence conundrum: harmonisation or fragmentation? 
 
The EU’s appetite for coherence has been recognised by European narratives as 
being essential to tackle cyber-threats.55 In practice, the EU has tried to construct 
vertical coherence through a ‘communitarising process’ aimed at steering member 
states to align with EU discourses, practices and values.56 The dimension of vertical 
coherence evaluated here is twofold. First, it chimes with the existence among the 
actors of a shared understanding and situational awareness of what cybersecurity is 
and how it should be addressed.57 Second, it reflects an institutional coordination 
which is determined by the “concrete practices of the actors involved in the 
cooperative efforts” and by the “incentives framing those relations”.58 However, a 
national resistance can be observed. The NIS Directive, considered as a milestone for 
the EU cybersecurity landscape, will be used as a case study.  
Overall, while this section portrays some of the pitfalls that thwart the EU’s quest for 
coherence, it also appraises the EU’s internal governance in cybersecurity, meaning 
the ability to ‘practice security’ and overcome obstacles. 
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‘Europeanising’ national approaches to cybersecurity: a success-story? 
Acknowledging that “European cybersecurity remains almost exclusively a national 
prerogative” and aware of differences in member states’ laws, the EU claims that 
cyber-issues are too complex to be left to the national level.59 Consequently, it rapidly 
called for a “single EU voice on cybersecurity”, with the intention of translating 
narratives into routinised practices. 60  The 2013 and 2017 versions of the EUCSS 
hammered home the necessity to forge a common approach among actors, 
instruments and policies61 and portrays a ‘cybersecurity community’ across the EU 
institutions.62 
The EU has reinforced its institutional apparatus and legal frameworks to make the 
member states converge towards common practices in order to counter cyber-
threats in a more effective way.63 Through the setting-up of agencies and competent 
authorities, the EU has pursued a constant improvement of coordination and 
cooperation. For instance, governments have been willing to concede an operational 
role to ENISA by strengthening its mandate. 64 However, the information-sharing hub 
lacks sufficient human and financial resources and seems limited to a mere supportive 
role.65  
A common cyber-culture among EU member states? 
In 2016, the EUGS pointed to the importance of fostering “a common cybersecurity 
culture”.66 Cyberspace is an emerging area particularly new to many EU member 
states, which may display different situational awareness and threat assessment.67 The 
standardisation and terminology used between actors is essential to converge 
towards common priorities and to fashion adequate strategies in order to identify and 
address a threat. However, there is a lack of a collective understanding of the 
concept. Some member states have their own conceptualisations of cybersecurity, 
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while others still do not dispose of a clear meaning of the latter.68 Furthermore, some 
governments are lagging behind in terms of shaping a national cyber-strategy despite 
cyber-attacks shedding light on their vulnerabilities. Neither cyber-incidents nor EU 
recommendations did spark among member states leaders an interest in adopting 
national policies or in putting forward an EU cybersecurity strategy.69 After the attack 
against Estonia, only a handful of member states were separately developing 
cybersecurity strategies, while the first European documents on cyberspace were 
being issued. Only since the 2017 ‘WannaCry’ attack, all member states have 
published they own cybersecurity strategies.70 
Albeit, whilst member states’ leaders “still conceive of cybersecurity as a private good 
to be dealt with through national strategies”, they have progressively recognised the 
EU framework as pertinent to address transnational cyber-issues. 71  Member states 
have injected EU-related components into their own strategies, making coherence 
“directly connected with the perceived need for an EU-wide approach to 
cybersecurity”.72 
EU member states between compliance and resistance 
Acknowledging the challenge of forging a common European strategy, the EU used 
its legal instruments to strengthen national strategies. Although the EU is able to 
produce hard legislation related to cyber-issues, member states are not always 
compliant when it comes to its implementation. The NIS Directive puts the emphasis 
on harmonising member states’ capabilities and preparedness, but illustrates at the 
same time a lack of coherence and coordination troubles.73 
The NIS Directive is the “first piece of European legislation that seeks to ensure a 
minimal institutional capability for reporting cyber-incidents across Member States”.74 
It requires member states to be sufficiently equipped and to cooperate effectively 
among each other in order to boost the overall common level of NIS security in the EU 
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and to avoid the fragmentation of practices.75 Nonetheless, although all member 
states unanimously approved the text, some have been reluctant to grant the EU a 
more stringent control over their cyber-activities.76 A majority of member states missed 
the target date (9 May 2018) to transpose the NIS Directive into their national legal 
frameworks.77 Yet, cyber-crises might provoke the member states to incorporate new 
measures to enhance coherence within the EU. The 2017 ‘WannaCry’ attack is 
considered as “the first ever case of cyber-cooperation at the EU level”.78 For the first 
time, national governments “exchanged information on a cybersecurity incident 
within the mechanism for operational cooperation under the NIS Directive”.79  
The case of Germany is particularly interesting. The country has always been 
disinclined “towards an evolution that could transfer excessively cybersecurity policies 
to EU institutions” and often tried to slow down the initiatives, but it fully transposed the 
NIS Directive before the deadline. 80  Thus, the lack of involvement from powerful 
countries does not impede the EU from a legal approximation of its cybersecurity 
policies. Additionally, some member states even offered a valuable contribution to 
the legalisation process, such as France, a “policy entrepreneur capable of building a 
coalition”.81 
Achieving coherence: a path fraught with pitfalls 
EU member states might “suffer significant consequences of a cyber-attack due to 
their own negligence and failure to implement or transpose relevant EU legal 
frameworks and security recommendations”. 82  Where does this resistance come 
from? While the EU’s efforts are converging towards increasing coherence among its 
members, its main features are still hindered by a number of constraints. 
First, as cyber-issues are linked to sovereignty, some member states remain sceptical 
towards an EU involvement and a collective vision on cybersecurity.83 Cybersecurity is 
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considered a sensitive area with classified data where information-sharing and 
exchange of good practices do not come spontaneously.84 This lack of mutual trust 
pushes EU member states to tackle cyber-issues on their own rather than conceive it 
as an EU competence.85 Moreover, the roots of different policy priorities are not only 
divergent political preferences, but also a ‘cyber-capabilities gap’ among member 
states. The EU includes countries both highly committed to meeting cybersecurity 
requirements and others being less advanced.86 Moreover, the immediate political 
attention of national decision-makers tends to be short lived: while a cyber-attack 
drives decision-makers to act, engagement at the EU level takes time, meaning that 
the topic is likely to drop from the national political radar.87 Finally, some countries cast 
doubt on ENISA’s capacities and may even regard other international frameworks 
such as NATO or sub-regional cooperation as better equipped to safeguard their 
security.88 
Assessment: an orchestra with distinct singers but one voice 
Coherence between member states and the EU in cyber-related matters faces many 
hurdles. In spite of the EU’s struggle to shape a more collective approach to cyber-
issues, national efforts have not been sufficient.89 This “mismatch between needs and 
responses” further contributes to the idea that the EU is not yet a collective cyber-
actor.90 However, these issues are innate to any topic associated with security or 
defence matters within the EU, as domestically driven approaches reflecting national 
preferences always result in fragmentation.91 It would be unjustified not to laud the 
EU’s improvements over the past years, especially because cyber is a fresh area. To 
tackle the discrepancies, the EU has shown a slow but concrete maturing, trying to 
make member states converge towards a more synchronised ensemble. The EU 
rapidly recognised that cyberspace remained a national prerogative, and adopted 
the role to facilitate coordination and to ensure consistency across national 
governments.92 This explains thus the rationale behind the perception of cybersecurity 
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as a “policy field that is considered to represent one of the main successes in security 
coherence”.93 
Moreover, cyber-crises have encouraged national decision-makers to cooperate 
more closely and to become more involved in common EU approaches.94 In the 
aftermath of cyber-attacks, the emergency of the situation and the fact that it takes 
time to develop European strategies explain why stronger responses have first 
flourished at national levels. Member states acknowledged that desirable results might 
best be achieved at the EU level and have “progressed beyond a ‘thin’ version to 
imbue the EU with autonomy”.95 These signs of commitment have led to the EU Cyber-
DT, a framework to address malicious cyber-activities within the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. This is a clear “demonstration of encouraged cooperation, greater 
matchmaking of interests and goals among the EU countries”.96  
The EU seeks to provide a long-term response, while it leverages national assets to 
react quickly and flexibly to imminent threats. This move is symbolised by the NIS 
Directive, which requests each member state to properly develop its own national 
cybersecurity strategy, with the tacit purpose to strengthen the overall level of 
cybersecurity of the Union. Christou summarises this paradox lying in the vertical axis 
of coherence scrutinised here:  
The EU remains anchored to an aggregating function in that the Member 
States retain important national prerogatives in cyberspace, but 
aggregation has meant a significant movement toward EU autonomy.97 
The EU has developed a decentralised ‘asymmetric governance’, in order to 
circumvent its inherent weaknesses and to increase coherence. Coupled with its 
ability to build resilience, it allows the EU to eventually become a global cyber-power. 
The last two sections have demonstrated that the EU is certainly a regional cyber-
power. Since the EU is striving to become a powerful global diplomatic actor, it does 
have the ambition to strengthen its role abroad as a cyber-player able to respond to 
crises, to promote its vision, to spread its values and norms, and to protect its interests 
and those of its partners. The EU has broadened its political agenda to embrace 
cyberspace as a major foreign policy area, modelling in turn new international policy 
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objectives.98 The challenge is to translate all of these provisions into efficient foreign 
policy instruments. The presence of both domestic capabilities (resilience and 
coherence) constitutes a fertile ground for the EU’s actorness externally. The following 
sections analyse the projection of the EU’s capabilities on the international stage 
based on two criteria: the EU’s responsiveness and attractiveness.  
 
The EU’s attractiveness: shaping a ‘collective immunity’ in cyberspace 
 
Over the last years, cyber-issues have gained increasing traction on the international 
agenda. The EU placed the establishment of a “coherent international cyberspace 
policy” among its main priorities.99 The adoption of European Council conclusions on 
‘cyber-diplomacy’ in 2015 marked the starting point of a “proactive role of the EU in 
international cyberspace policy-making”.100 Its main purpose is to promote “a global, 
open, free, stable and secure cyberspace where human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law fully apply”.101 Linked to its ambition to become an 
international diplomatic and security actor, the EU sought to establish strong 
multilateral and bilateral networks, deepen strategic partnerships with other cyber-
players, and heighten the cyber-resilience in and cyber-capacities of third countries. 
In turn, this attractiveness, combined with a ‘normative magnetism’, that is inducing 
progressively third countries to conform to European norms, could lead to the 
recognition, acceptance and authority of the EU as a global cyber-actor. 
Multilateralism: establishing an active EU-wide position in cyberspace 
The EU prioritised “the crafting of collective efforts and multilateral instruments” to 
strengthen global cyber-resilience and to promote global norms and practices in 
cyberspace. 102  It has sought to enhance ties with international and regional 
organisations. 103  Since many of these bodies “favour a more positive agenda in 
cyberspace […], the EU could use its established cooperation channels” to include 
cyber-aspects and project its norms and values.104 
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The EU draws on multilateral instruments to indirectly promote its values and norms, as 
well as to enhance international cooperation and mutual assistance. It is worth 
analysing the EU’s reliance on the Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention, the 
“most far-reaching multilateral agreement on cybercrime”. 105  As the only binding 
international agreement on cybersecurity, the EU considers it “a useful instrument for 
the global promotion of European norms”.106 The 2013 EUCSS put forward the concept 
of ‘cybercrime’ alongside ‘cybersecurity’ to link actions to the Budapest Convention 
while the 2017 EUCSS refers to the Convention as “the model for drafting national 
cyber-crime legislation and […] for international cooperation”.107 For instance, the EU 
has made its financial support for cyber-capacity building in third countries conditional 
upon their compliance with the Convention.108 In addition, the EU considers some 
international organisations as crucial platforms. It has seen the possibility to build a 
fruitful complementarity with NATO in fostering its cyber-defence posture, mainly 
through the collaborative development of resilience capabilities.109 NATO is the only 
international organisation whose cooperation with the EU is explicitly highlighted in the 
2017 EUCSS.110 Since 2010 both entities have established regular informal staff-to-staff 
consultation on cyber-issues or synchronised cyber-exercises.111 The deepening of the 
strategic relationship with NATO was initiated in 2016 with “one of the most prominent 
cyber-cooperation schemes”.112 
Enhancing cooperation in cyberspace through bilateral strategic partnerships 
Multilateral ties allow the EU to project its own vision internationally and to shape 
cyberspace by forging a consensual response to cyber-threats. However, since the 
“multilateral fabric is particularly thin in [this] policy area, bilateral cooperation 
appears necessary to palliate and, eventually, strengthen multilateral instruments”.113 
The 2013 EUCSS and the 2015 Council conclusions called for an “increased 
engagement and stronger relations with key international partners”.114 The 2016 EUGS 
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stressed the need for the EU to “enhance its cybersecurity with core partners” while 
the 2017 EUCSS underlines the need to “step up dialogues with third countries to 
promote global convergence and responsible behaviour in this area”.115  
To shape Internet governance with ‘like-minded’ partners, the EU “has managed to 
assert itself as a worthwhile interlocutor in the cyber-domain with all its strategic 
partners […] embedding them in a network of dialogues, joint statements and 
common initiatives”. 116  Gradually incorporating cyber-issues into the cooperation 
agenda, the EU has formalised a “network of bilateral strategic partnerships” with key 
cyber-actors which is devoted to cooperation, information-sharing, the exchange of 
best practices and expertise, and confidence-building measures.117 It first inserted 
cyber-issues into pre-existing dialogues but rapidly acknowledged the need to launch 
specific cyber-dialogues on a bilateral level. There is now “at least one dialogue on 
cyber-related issues with each of the EU’s ten strategic partners” (see Figure 2).118 
Among them, the EU-US Cyber Dialogue is the institutionally most developed and the 
most ambitious, and it is the only one covering “triangulated efforts for cyber-capacity 
building in third countries”.119 Moreover, the “rule-making in the areas of cybercrime 
and cybersecurity between the EU and the US constitutes the first major transatlantic 
cooperation in security since a decade”.120 The EU may also attempt to cement a 
strategic cyber-partnership with the United Kingdom, as “Brexit will leave a significant 
gap in the EU’s cyber-capabilities”.121 
Figure 2 – EU cyber-dialogues with strategic partners 
                                                 
115 EEAS, EUGS 2016, op. cit., p. 22; European Commission & High Representative, JOIN(2017) 
450 final, op. cit., p. 19. 
116 Renard, 2018, op. cit., p. 327. 
117 Ibid., pp. 322, 326. 
118 Ibid., p. 334. 
119 Ibid., p. 328. 
120 Fahey, op. cit., pp. 55-56. 
121 Ivan, op. cit., p. 11. 
EU Diplomacy Paper 1/2021 
23 
Source: Renard, 2018, op. cit., p. 329. 
Cyberspace represents today an “indicator of the depth of the political/security 
relation and trust between partners”.122 Conversely, partnerships with cyber-players 
perceived as threats are less developed. Instead, the EU focused on confidence-
building aspects, as it seeks “to keep the dialogue open on contentious issues”.123 For 
instance, in the case of China, the EU has included chapters on cyber in joint 
cooperation agendas and established the Sino-European Cyber Dialogue.124 In EU-
Russia relations, Crimea’s annexation shattered the potential cooperation on cyber-
issues. 
Capacity building: durable and sustainable cyber-resilience in third countries 
The EU also recognised that capacity building in third countries aimed at enhancing 
cyber-resilience is crucial to protect its interests and project its values. Whereas the 
number of Internet users “is expected to reach 4.7 billion by 2025, most of this growth 
is happening in the developing countries and emerging economies”. 125  This 
technological progress will go hand in hand with higher domestic vulnerabilities and 
exposition to external cyber-threats if a sufficient degree of resilience is not attained. 
For the EU, this means that allies, potential economic partners, neighbourhood and 
candidate countries lacking proper cyber-capabilities might be hugely impacted by 
malicious activities. This could damage economic development, destabilise the 
political order and in fine escalate the risks in sensitive zones.126 Consequently, the EU 
pursues the goal of stepping up cyber-capacity building programmes in partner 
countries in order to improve their cyber-resilience.127 The EUGS underlined that the EU 
“will engage in […] capacity building with [its] partners”.128 The 2017 EUCSS promoted 
the creation of a “Capacity Building Network to support third countries’ ability to 
address cyber-threats”.129  
In concrete terms, EU projects and initiatives have spanned the globe, e.g. the 
CB4Resilience (Capacity Building and Cooperation to enhance Cyber Resilience) and 
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the ENCYSEC (Enhancing Cybersecurity) projects.130 In the framework of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, the EU placed “fighting cybercrime” among its prime 
concerns. 131  For instance, it implemented Technical Assistance and Information 
Exchange Instruments to assist Ukraine in strengthening its cybersecurity capacity.132 
The EU launched a number of projects in collaboration with the Council of Europe such 
as the CyberSouth programme which aims at strengthening cyber-capabilities to 
tackle cybercrime in the Southern neighbourhood (especially Algeria, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia), GLACY+ focusing “on supporting countries that may 
serve as hubs to share their experience within their respective regions”, or “iPROCEEDS 
targeting […] online crime in South-eastern Europe and Turkey, and “Cybercrime&EAP 
II and III on international cooperation” in the neighbourhood.133 
Assessment: fomenting a collective immunity against cyber-threats 
The EU promotes a multi-stakeholder model in which a broad international community 
composed of ‘like-minded’ partners is in charge of shaping a coherent cyberspace. 
To strengthen global governance in order to mount the most effective response to 
address the challenges of cyber-warfare, the EU has spurred international 
cooperation. 134  It relies on a dense network of key bilateral cyber-partnerships, 
carefully crafted through regular cyber-dialogues that aim at building mutual 
confidence and facilitating international consensus at the multilateral level. Moreover, 
the EU has initiated cooperation with regional and international organisations such as 
the Council of Europe and NATO to supplement its own approach or to address 
shortcomings. The EU has also invested in third countries in order to provide them with 
capacity building to reach a sufficient level of resilience.  
This international engagement allows the EU to spread its vision, norms and values 
abroad. In turn, these ties have stimulated the coherence and “integration process of 
the EU’s cyber-policy […] and a common European cybersecurity agenda.135 They 
represent a springboard to influence international debates and constitute a conditio 
sine qua non to be granted a global strategic status in cyberspace.136 The EU aims at 
                                                 
130 Pawlak, “Protecting and defending Europe’s cyberspace”, op. cit., p. 110. 
131 European Commission & High Representative, Review of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, JOIN(2015) 50 final, 18 November 2015.  
132 Pawlak, “Protecting and defending Europe’s cyberspace”, op. cit., p. 110. 
133 Pawlak, “Cyber Resilience”, op. cit., pp. 18-19. 
134 Pawlak & Biersteker, op. cit., p. 84. 
135 Giantas & Liaropoulos, op. cit., p. 23. 
136 Renard, op. cit., pp. 325, 334. 
EU Diplomacy Paper 1/2021 
25 
sculpting a collective international immunity to enhance the capacity of each actor 
and stakeholder to prevent malicious cyber-operations and effectively deal with their 
consequences. In the long run, strengthening the cyber-environment would reduce 
the destabilisation of the international order by shrinking potential escalations of a 
conflict.137 This international posture considerably underpins the EU’s cyber-actorness, 
even if there is still “ample scope for boosting the EU’s presence and visibility in the 
cyber-arena”.138 
To be able to promote its vision of an ‘open, safe and secure cyberspace’, the EU has 
not only sought to build international resilience but also to frame a more active 
resistance against malicious cyber-players. The next section assesses the 
‘responsiveness’ criterion, that is, the EU’s ability to mobilise its instruments, mechanisms 
and resources on the international stage to counter hostile cyber-activities. 
 
The EU’s responsiveness: oxymoronic cyber-powers? 
 
Facing the shortcomings of existing muddled international frameworks to set up rules 
in cyberspace, the EU has moulded its own sanctioning apparatus. But rather than 
becoming an assertive cyber-player, the EU is using a preventive approach to shape 
cyber-deterrence which could ultimately make it an international cyber-mediator. In 
turn, some countries might be inclined to climb in the bandwagon led by the Union by 
setting up their own sanctioning frameworks. However, this section also draws 
attention to the pitfalls the EU is either afraid or unable to overcome, such as the 
challenge of attributing cyber-attacks. Finally, what is overall remarkable is the EU 
‘paradoxical sleep’ in relation to its cyber-sanctions regime. 
The blurry international law at the origins of the EU’s cyber-sanctions regime 
The cyber-sphere is highly contested by a growing number of international cyber-
players but remains an under-regulated policy area, “where existing international law, 
rules and norms are undermined through state practice”.139 The EU’s ‘cyber-acquis’ 
clearly signals the normative framework the EU upholds: “a rules-based order based 
on the application of [existing] international law and adherence to voluntary norms of 
responsible state behaviour”, in accordance with the international consensus built 
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within the United Nations.140 However, a formal legal delineation about what would 
be a ‘punishable’ behaviour is not established. 141  States’ behavioural norms are 
blurred and views on cyber-governance diverge.142 Faced with this ambiguity, due to 
the non-binding nature of norms in cyberspace, the EU established its own mechanism 
to ensure compliance with existing international law and responsible state behaviour 
but also to make sure that perpetrators are held accountable: the Cyber-DT for a joint 
EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber-activities.143 It encompasses a plethora of 
diplomatic and operational instruments to “promote responsible behaviour and 
eradicate impunity in cyberspace”: preventive, cooperative, stability, and restrictive 
measures.144 
This ‘cyber-sanctions regime’ aims not only at enhancing cybersecurity within the EU 
but also at creating a stable international cyberspace.145 Cyber-sanctions entail three 
functions: coercion in order to bring about a change of behaviour by the target; the 
constraint of malicious activities by limiting access to resources; and the signalling of 
norm preferences and potential consequences both to the target and to the 
international community.146 Council Decision 2019/797 and the Council Regulation 
2019/796 define the scope that might activate the imposition of sanctions. It embraces 
“cyber-attacks […] which constitute an external threat to the Union […] [or] against 
third States or international organisations”. 147  The idea of ‘collective cyber-
securitisation’ and the ‘us against them’ vision is reflected here.  
Applying the EU’s main assets in cyberspace: fostering mediation and magnetism 
European policy-makers based the sanctions regime on the assumption that 
“signalling the likely consequence of a cyber-attack would dissuade potential 
attackers”.148 The EU’s past practice of using restrictive measures to promote its core 
values tipped the scales in favour of the use of cyber-sanctions to “invariably send 
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normative signals” rather than as a coercive instrument.149 Consequently, deterrence 
and signalling norms preferences are intrinsically bound: cyber-sanctions would have 
a constructive role in preventing attacks and reducing the risks of conflict escalation. 
To increase its chances of succeeding, this EU cyber-deterrent and signalling posture 
might be coupled with preventive diplomacy, a “key component of the EU’s DNA”.150 
It may further boost the EU’s credibility internationally and lead the EU to become a 
potential mediator in cyber-conflict prevention and de-escalation. 
The EU could benefit from its dense network of international cyber-partnerships to 
promote standards and good practices in cyberspace. A combination of its 
framework with other sanctions regimes would generate “synergies stemming from 
joint designations from different countries and regional or international 
organisations”.151 The EU’s regime might serve as a reference that “could inspire other 
nations to rapidly follow suit […] and contribute to strengthening global compliance 
with the existing norms”.152 Approving restrictive measures in support of third countries 
might also guarantee that EU values and interests are mutually reinforced. In turn, the 
proliferation of cyber-sanctions regimes within ‘like-minded’ partners could act as a 
force multiplier in terms of effectiveness, impact, and symbolic weight (to date, eight 
non-EU members have aligned with the Council Decision 2019/797).153 Coupled with 
some international backup, the EU cyber-sanctions regime could strongly enhance 
the role of the EU as a global cyber-actor. 
The challenge of attribution: a cumbersome decision-making process 
The EU has opted for developing the signalling capacities of its sanctions regime to 
discourage potential norm-violators from committing cyber-attacks. In this regard, the 
attribution of an attack to an actor – a precondition for addressing effectively 
malicious cyber-activities – may also have a signalling role. It denotes the “process of 
tracking, identifying and laying blame on the perpetrator of a cyber-attack”. 154 
Alongside the principles of necessity and proportionality, attribution is required for 
granting legality to any cyber-sanction under international law.155 It is essential since 
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the decision to apply targeted sanctions is correlated with the level of reliable 
evidence and the degree of confidence for attributing a cyber-offence.156 
However, only a few European governments have already publicly attributed 
offensive cyber-operations to states, when the EU remained mute on the topic. As an 
illustration, while several member states assigned responsibility of the ‘NotPetya’ 
attack to Russia, the EU only condemned the attacks without a collective 
attribution.157 The EU fears that a wrong attribution would damage its credibility as a 
global cyber-actor.158 To avoid the ‘naming and shaming effect’, many measures 
foreseen in the toolbox do not require a high level of attribution while the cyber-
sanctions regime, at the other end of the spectrum, has been conceived to blame 
individuals or entities but in no case to target states.159 Still, an EU collective attribution 
to non-state actors remains a laborious task. Member state governments advocate for 
preserving confidentiality given that gathering evidence for attribution could 
compromise sensitive national information. 160  Moreover, they lack the “required 
cyber- and intelligence capabilities, and the political and administrative processes 
necessary to properly attribute malicious cyber-incidents”.161 Additionally, member 
states are often influenced by national considerations, especially when outcomes 
might have implications for countries they share interests with. Given the EU’s 
fragmented decision-making system, these divergences engender difficulties to reach 
unanimity, and thus to deploy a common response. So far, the Union has abstained 
from enlisting any individual or entity.162 
The European ‘paradoxical sleep’ 
The cyber-sanctions regime, symbolising the EU’s potential to become a responsive 
global cyber-actor, contains many incongruities. As mentioned, the EU could play its 
diplomatic trump card to act as a global mediator in cyberspace. Nonetheless, this 
function seems incompatible with the firmer approach – ensuring accountability and 
enhancing enforcement – adopted with the cyber-sanctions regime, which gives 
more ‘teeth’ to the EU.163 Mediation and attribution are antinomic terms: at the same 
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time, the EU cannot attribute and endorse the role of a mediator, which is by definition 
against pointing a finger at any particular side. Furthermore, there is a tension between 
the EU’s ambition to forge deterrence through compelling tools and the tendency to 
elude the question of attribution. In accordance with the 2016 EUGS – “principled 
pragmatism will guide our external action”164 – the adoption of the cyber-sanctions 
regime is a sign of a more pragmatic stance in the world, reflected in the absence of 
direct references to values in the legal texts implementing it.165 This fact spells one 
major contradiction: the EU relies on its cyber-sanctions regime to forge deterrence 
but it lacks the courage to attribute any cyber-operation to a potential state 
perpetrator, out of fear of political, reputational and economic costs and of 
escalating retaliation. Since “sanctions in the cyber-domain are more likely to deter 
states, but are less likely to deter individuals from acting in the name of states”, how 
can this deterrence be effective if the EU does not take responsibility?166 Adopting 
sanctions might worsen the relationship with the targeted country and entail the risk of 
reprisal, but would the lack of reaction not be likely to encourage more damaging 
behaviour?167 
The responsiveness criterion of the EU’s international actorness in cyberspace is 
imbued with a ‘paradoxical sleep’: the brain acts, but the body is paralysed. During 
the night, the EU’s creativity process is sharpened. It conceives ambitious scopes of 
action internationally, and crafts models for effective response to counter cyber-
attacks. However, when it awakens, the EU has to face its own contradictions, and is 
mired in its relative international passivity, torn between the different approaches of its 
members. 
Assessment: an ungovernable universe? 
In 2004, the Council affirmed that it “will work to further refine sanctions and to adapt 
the instrument to the new security environment”. 168  The recently designed cyber-
sanctions regime fits well with this ambition. It seeks to ensure compliance with 
international law and to enforce norms of responsible state behaviour in 
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cyberspace.169 In this regard, the EU might become a global norm enforcer. Moreover, 
the EU aims at forging deterrence through the signalling function of its new regime. 
The combination of these sanctions with conventional diplomatic tools could make 
the EU a legitimate mediator for conflict prevention in cyberspace. 170  The EU’s 
magnetic attraction could further incite third countries to imitate the European model 
in implementing this kind of framework. 
Nevertheless, there is still a gap between the adoption of the regime and its concrete 
operationalisation. Attributing cyber-misdemeanour to states deemed responsible 
remains the sole privilege of member states, while the EU keeps dodging the issue. 
Paralysed, the cyber-sanctions regime has been caught in dilemmas and paradoxes, 
eroding the EU’s international retort in cyberspace. When it comes to addressing 
malicious actors in cyberspace, the cyber-powers at the disposal of the EU – 
deterrence, mediation, magnetism, attribution, sanctions – seem oxymoronic, as they 
are strongly incompatible. From dream to reality, these tergiversations hamper the EU’s 
action and jeopardises its will to take further steps towards becoming a leading cyber-
power in the world.  
 
Conclusion: a ‘forward-looking’ intergalactic cyber-power? 
 
This paper aimed at figuring out to what extent the EU possesses sufficient capabilities 
to become a global cyber-power. For that purpose, the study has scrutinised through 
a kinetic approach four criteria that allow evaluating the EU’s international actorness 
in cyberspace: resilience, coherence, attractiveness, and responsiveness. The EU has 
evolved from an inward-looking cyber-actor to a globally-oriented one. 
First, the multiplication of cyber-attacks has raised awareness about the need to 
rethink the EU’s political orientations. The Manichean perception of cyberspace as a 
potential nest of threats that could induce irreversible damages led the EU to conceive 
specialised entities and to establish or toughen legal frameworks in order to shape a 
“comprehensive and integral cybersecurity strategy [to] mitigate the cyber-
threats”.171 It resulted in the creation of a ‘collective cyber-securitisation’ highlighting 
the capability of the EU to build inland resilience. 
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Second, this ‘collective cyber-securitisation’ has enabled the EU “to carry out the 
functions of security governance”, at least regionally. 172 This governance is 
asymmetrical because member states have been reluctant to give too much power 
to the supranational body. Yet, this reluctance did not impede the EU from exerting 
authority and enhancing the overall level of coherence by creating a synergetic 
approach. The EU has demonstrated that it does “add value in this domain, primarily 
through bolstering capacities [and] law enforcement cooperation”.173 
Third, the EU has extended its ambition to become a global strategic actor to the 
cyberspace. The Union’s normative role in promoting a rules-based international order 
and its multilateral and bilateral cyber-engagements abroad allowed it to shape a 
‘collective immunity’ in cyberspace and to gain international recognition as a 
powerful cyber-actor. 
Fourth, at first sight, the cyber-sanctions regime seems to boost the EU’s global 
actorness. Nevertheless, the EU is constrained to play a mediation or advisory role 
rather than assuming an operational function in cyberspace. Entangled in a 
‘paradoxical sleep’, the EU is devoid of means to fulfil its global ambitions. 
There is an incremental looping effect: cyber-crises are a driver leading the EU to 
become resilient and to improve the vertical coherence between member states and 
the Union. Hence, the EU, equipped with new capabilities, becomes a stronger 
international cyber-actor. Recognised as a reliable cyber-partner, its power of 
attractiveness increases, while its emerging ability to respond to cyber-attacks deters 
potential malicious enemies. The EU is thus a capable cyber-actor with extensive 
capacities, does possess the normative stance required to be internationally 
considered legitimate, and its recognition by other actors as a partner in this field 
makes the EU a credible cyber-player. However, the EU international ‘cyber-power’ is 
still incomplete due to the absence of a common strategic vision for security and 
defence among its members, distrust regarding information-sharing, cyber-capability 
disparities, the attribution’s puzzle, etc.  
The paper argues that, in an alarming cybersecurity environment, the EU is, so far, a 
regional cyber-power, but it has the potential to become a leading global cyber-
power. In order to succeed, it must be able to overcome the constraints that are partly 
inherent to its nature. Like the Guardians of the Galaxy, the “EU’s strength comes from 
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the qualities and powers of its individual members”.174 The prophecy of a potential 
‘cyber-apocalypse’ crouched in the shadows may urge the member states to 
transform the Union into a global cyber-hero. In the cyber-galaxy, the EU has become 
a star but it still cannot shine.  
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